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**1962/10/25**

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October 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting 10/25/62 -- 10:00 a.m.  
All Members present.


McCone reported on intelligence, reviewing summary of 25 October, including pencilled memorandums as indicated, plus Cline memorandum of 25 October on talks with Sir Kenneth Strong, and the Watch Report of same date.

I called special attention to the BELOVODSK and reported on Page II-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by Canadians as reported on page IV-2. Also the shipping schedule.

McNamara reported that at 7:00 o'clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker BUCHAREST which responded destination was Havana, cargo was petroleum and the BUCHAREST was permitted to proceed under surveillance. He stated that no United States Navy ships had orders to board. He recommended orders be issued to immediately board Bloc ships and then the BUCHAREST be boarded. Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to board the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the GROZNY, a tanker but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks. Later in the meeting decision was reached not to board the BUCHAREST. Contact was to be made with the GROZNY as early as possible and that was estimated to be about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Friday, October 26th.



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McCone then noted the number of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned back. Dillon asked about ships in the Pacific. The President asked whether Soviet ships bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course. McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon.

There was a further discussion of the policy of stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships. It was decided that all ships must be hailed.

Rusk raised the question of discussions with the United Nations. Draft of U.S. reply to the U Thant letter was approved with modifications. It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal of missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN inspectors be permitted at once.

Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President of the 24th of October and the Kennedy reply. McNamara raised the question of accelerating or raising the escalation of the actions we have so far taken, expressing concern over the plateau, indicating determination to meet our ultimate objective of taking out the missile sites.

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Rusk then asked certain actions on the part of CIA as follows:  
(1) An answer to questions of the effect on Cuba because ships were turned about as indicated in recent reports; (2) What had happened to Soviet ships which were bound elsewhere than Cuba; (3) The general Cuban reaction to our actions to date:

- (a) Do they know about Soviet missiles?
- (b) Have they heard the President's speech?
- (c) What is the morale in Cuba?

McCone promised answers.

John A. McCone  
Director

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